Azov and Russia

Since its founding, Azov has been a target for infiltration by Russian agents, aiming to gather information about the unit’s locations, types of weaponry, operational information, and personal data regarding the unit’s command and personnel.

One of the most notable cases involved uncovering a long-term Russian spy within Azov. This was an undercover officer from Vladivostok, who had served in the Russian Marines and as a field officer with SOBR. Russian blogger and fighter for the so-called “DPR,” Alexander Zhuchkovskiy, mentioned that Aleksey Filipov (codename “Fog”) was “the most successful undercover agent working behind enemy lines for Novorossiya” at the time. The Russian spy was sent to Ukraine in January 2015, crossed the border, and posed as a volunteer who had defected to Ukraine to “fight against the Russian government.” Under the orders of his handlers, Filipov collected information on volunteer battalions, the supply of equipment and weapons for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the movements, locations, and means of Ukrainian military forces. According to Zhuchkovskiy, Filipov was also directly involved in the killings of representatives from volunteer battalions.

2022 — …

On September 5, 2022, the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Chernivtsi sentenced two Ukrainian traitors, exposed by the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine], for passing information about the location of Azov positions to Russian handlers.

On September 16, 2022, the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine] detained a Russian agent attempting to enlist in Special Forces Detachment Azov. This Donetsk resident held a “DPR” passport and had previously fought as part of the pro-Russian terrorist forces. He was recruited by Russian special services to conduct reconnaissance and subversive activities against the unit [Azov].

On October 6, 2022, during a briefing by Azov regiment commanders, Major Bohdan Krotevych stated that GRU representatives tried to recruit Azov POWs, claiming that “Azov fights well” and suggesting they “should work together to destroy the U.S. and the West.”

On November 25, 2022, the SBU detained a former employee of Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs who had decided to defect to the aggressor state. Among the classified information he had obtained on Ukrainian security personnel, which he managed to get a hold of following the his Russian curators orders, was data regarding Azov’s command.

On April 27, 2023, a head judge of the Poltava District Court, recruited by the FSB, was exposed for conducting intelligence operations against Ukraine. She was accused of providing the occupiers with information about the movement of three Azov fighters from Mariupol to the Mangush area.

On July 13, 2023, the SBU [Security Service of Ukriane] sentenced an FSB agent who had created a spy network in Ukraine to gather the coordinates of Azov’s locations.

Key MYTHS in Russian propaganda about Azov:

“In 2014, when volunteer battalions defended the country, many of their statements were radical towards the Russian Federation. These were volunteers with their personal views. The Azov Regiment is not a volunteer battalion, but part of the National Guard, an official part of our army. Those who wanted to engage in politics left and do so now. Those who chose to serve in the NGU [National Guard of Ukraine] are now part of the NGU. What Russian servicemen are doing in our country — that’s Nazism”. 
— President Volodymyr Zelensky

Russian propaganda media often fabricated fakes about Azov

LIES	TRUTH
Azov performs satanic rituals	Azov annually holds memorial events to commemorate the fallen fighters of the unit.
An Azov fighter accused the Ukrainian army of shelling Olenivka on July 28, 2022	Russian propagandists forced a POW from Olenivka to make a statement, which was written for him, at gun point. Independent investigations point to a planned explosion and a deliberate terrorist attack against Ukrainian servicemen of the Azov regiment
Azov blew up the Mariupol Drama Theater	Russian aviation carried out an airstrike on the Drama Theater building on 16.03.2022, where a civilian shelter for Mariupol residents was equipped. At the same time, Russian propaganda media first accused the building of housing an “Azov base” and then released a statement that the building was blown up by Mariupol defenders.
Azov seized foreign ships and crews in Mariupol port	Azov fighters defending the port of Mariupol helped provided first aid to crew members of civilian vessels wounded by Russian shelling who were in the port of Mariupol at the time of the full-scale Russian invasion. The Russian fake was also refuted by the vessel owners and crew members.
Azov set up a base in a Mariupol maternity hospital	Russians carried out an airstrike on the building of a Mariupol maternity hospital on 9.03.2022, killing 3 people and injuring 17, including women in labor. Azov set up its base in the underground shelters of Azovstal from the first days of the full-scale invasion, where civilians were evacuated due to massive shelling of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals.
Azov trains terrorists for operations in Europe and the Middle East	Azov servicemen conduct military exercises only for the unit’s personnel and for individual units of the National Guard. None of the current or former members of Azov have been involved in any illegal activities in other countries or in terrorist groups. The unit also accepted only Ukrainian citizens up to the 2022.
Azov crucified and burned alive a “DPR” fighter	Russian propaganda media distributed a staged video by the pro-Russian hacker group “Cyber Berkut” on resources under their control to accuse Azov fighters of human rights violations.
Azov spreads Nazi insignia	An analysis of the images shows that Russian propagandists are distributing a photo montage of a 2015 photo of Azov regiment fighters with a swastika added to it. Next to the photo is a NATO flag.

Azov in western media: proof reading

Due to the prevalence of fakes and manipulations, as well as the lack of truthful and comprehensive materials about the unit, the number of biased publications about Azov has only increased over the years. Therefore, when reading materials about Azov today, one should be extremely critical of their content and presentation.

Azov fighters are Ukraine’s greatest weapon and may be its greatest threat

The Guardian
10 Sep 2014
Author: Shaun Walker

Thesis	Refutation
The battalion’s far-right volunteers’	Ideological Bias Against Azov as a “Far-Right” Military UnitAccording to Ukrainian law, any military formation cannot have a specific ideological or political bias. Among the fighters of Azov from the beginning, there were supporters of various viewpoints: political, religious, and ideological. Azov was formed as a combat unit with the primary mission of fighting against Russian occupation and pro-Russian terrorists in southeastern Ukraine. The initial members of the unit were primarily residents of the occupied Donbas and Crimea, as well as residents of cities under a significant threat of Russian invasion — such as Kharkiv, for example.
The battalion’s far-right volunteers’ desire to ‘bring the fight to Kiev’ is a danger to post-conflict stability	Excessive Politicization of the Combat Unit and the Creation of Imaginary Threats to Ukraine’s Political StateTwo overtly pro-Russian narratives also deserve special attention: the use of the Russian transliteration of Ukraine’s capital, “Kiev,” and the incorrect characterization of the de facto war as a “conflict.”
“I have nothing against Russian nationalists, or a great Russia,” said Dmitry, as we sped through the dark Mariupol night in a pickup truck, a machine gunner positioned in the back. “But Putin’s not even a Russian. Putin’s a Jew.”	The article begins with a classic manipulation and framing of the ideological worldview of an individual fighter (citing the Russian transliteration of his pseudonym) — anti-Semitism and imperialism. The Russian imperial idea denies Ukraine’s agency and independence, portraying the state as a “separatist entity sponsored by the West.” According to this logic, any supporter of Ukraine’s independence is labeled a criminal and a nationalist. From the beginning, Azov included representatives of various nationalities, including Jews.
Volunteer grouping	The term “volunteer group” has a stylistic connotation and implies “gang group.” However, Azov has existed as a battalion of the Patrol Police Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS) since its establishment on May 5, 2014, and became part of the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) on September 17, 2014.
But there is an increasing worry that while the Azov and other volunteer battalions might be Ukraine’s most potent and reliable force on the battlefield against the separatists, they also pose the most serious threat to the Ukrainian government, and perhaps even the state, when the conflict in the east is over.	The politicization of the unit and the creation of an imaginary threat based on biases about the unit’s actual tasks.
The Azov causes particular concern due to the far right, even neo-Nazi, leanings of many of its members.	The unit includes fighters with diverse views and beliefs, and no comprehensive statistics on this have ever been maintained within the battalion. To join, one had to complete a fairly rigorous basic training course and demonstrate strong moral and volitional qualities.
Dmitry claimed not to be a Nazi, but waxed lyrical about Adolf Hitler as a military leader, and believes the Holocaust never happened. Not everyone in the Azov battalion thinks like Dmitry, but after speaking with dozens of its fighters and embedding on several missions during the past week in and around the strategic port city of Mariupol, the Guardian found many of them to have disturbing political views, and almost all to be intent on “bringing the fight to Kiev” when the war in the east is over.	The statements regarding Hitler and the Holocaust are not presented as direct quotes, which could indicate deliberate manipulation. Additionally, the lack of a specific list of fighters, their number, names, and call signs who may have made “politically incorrect” statements could also suggest intentional manipulation — either to tarnish the unit’s reputation or to misinform the English-speaking readership.
The battalion’s symbol is reminiscent of the Nazi Wolfsangel, though the battalion claims it is in fact meant to be the letters N and I crossed over each other, standing for “national idea”.	The Russian interpretation of Azov’s symbols as an allusion to the “Wolfsangel.”
Many of its members have links with neo-Nazi groups, and even those who laughed off the idea that they are neo-Nazis did not give the most convincing denials.	The “neo-Nazism” of Azov fighters is a journalistic cliché and bias that originated from Russian media. Azov fighters are forced to defend themselves against these clichés, but their defenses, which initially place the fighters in a position of being victims of slander, are deemed “insufficient” by journalists.
“Of course not, it’s all made up, there are just a lot of people who are interested in Nordic mythology,” said one fighter when asked if there were neo-Nazis in the battalion. When asked what his own political views were, however, he said “national socialist”. As for the swastika tattoos on at least one man seen at the Azov base, “the swastika has nothing to do with the Nazis, it was an ancient sun symbol,” he claimed.	A journalist saw a single (!) fighter at the Azov base with a tattoo that resembled a swastika. From this, he concluded that Azov is “neo-Nazi.” However, since the journalist references a quote from a member of the unit, the tattoo could have been a “kolovorot” (some fighters are neo-pagans, as evidenced by the presence of wooden idols at their bases) or a swastika associated with Eastern religions (Buddhism or Hinduism). Even if it was a swastika referring to Nazi Germany, the journalist saw only one fighter with this symbol but generalized his conclusion to the entire unit.
The battalion has drawn far-right volunteers from abroad, such as Mikael Skillt, a 37-year-old Swede, trained as a sniper in the Swedish army, who described himself as an “ethnic nationalist” and fights on the front line with the battalion.	Michael Skillt, after serving in Azov, stayed in Ukraine, got married, and has a family. This statement seems to imply a hidden threat that other “ethnonationalists” might join Azov and pose a threat to their home countries. However, using the example of Michael Skillt, and indeed all the foreign volunteers who served in Azov, it is clear that these concerns were exaggerated.
Indeed, much of what Azov members say about race and nationalism is strikingly similar to the views of the more radical Russian nationalists fighting with the separatist side. The battalion even has a Russian volunteer, a 30-year-old from St Petersburg who refused to give his name. He said he views many of the Russian rebel commanders positively, especially Igor Strelkov, a former FSB officer who has a passion for military re-enactments and appears to see himself as a tsarist officer. He “wants to resurrect a great Russia, said the volunteer; but Strelkov is “only a pawn in Putin’s game,” he said, and he hoped that Russia would some time have a “nationalist, violent Maidan” of its own.	The personal opinion of an individual fighter, a Russian volunteer, cannot represent the position of the unit. He likely wanted to emphasize that on the opposing side, there are not only foolish or incompetent people but motivated officers of the Russian security forces.
“Everything in this war is based on personal links; Kiev does nothing,” explained the Azov’s Russian volunteer, as we sped towards a checkpoint in a civilian Chevrolet; the boot full with the boxes of bullets and rocket-propelled grenade launchers; one of the windows shot out by gunfire during a recent battle.	The statement is manipulative because it emphasizes the apparent “lack of control” of the military unit by its command. In fact, there is a high level of horizontal cooperation between different units and branches of the military in Ukraine, which allowed for effective resistance to the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 through high mobility, information exchange, and close interaction between military units.
“This is how it works. You go to some hot spot, they see you’re really brave, you exchange phone numbers, and next time you can call in a favour. If you need an artillery strike you can call a general and it will take three hours and you’ll be dead. Or you can call the captain or major commanding the artillery battalion and they will help you out straight away. We are Azov and they know that if they ever needed it, we would be there for them.”	Another excerpt that is supposed to expose the “lack of control” of the unit by the higher military command actually highlights the significant changes in the quality of the officer and senior ranks in the Ukrainian military after 2014. At the same time, the generals raised in the Soviet Union were quite inflexible and unprepared for network-centric warfare. This serves as a good illustration of the qualitative transformations within the Ukrainian army, which become especially evident over time.
“Generals like those in charge of Ilovaysk should be imprisoned for treason,” said Skillt. “Heads are going to roll for sure, I think there will be a battle for power.”	The personal opinion of a unit fighter is presented as a threat to Ukraine’s political leadership.
The Ukrainian armed forces are “an army of lions led by a sheep”, said Dmitry, and there is only so long that dynamic can continue. With so many armed, battle-hardened and angry young men coming back from the front, there is a danger that the rolling of heads could be more than a metaphor. Dmitry said he believes that Ukraine needs “a strong dictator to come to power who could shed plenty of blood but unite the nation in the process”.	The personal opinion of a unit fighter is presented as a threat to Ukraine’s political leadership.
The Russian volunteer fighting with the Azov said he believes Ukraine needs “a junta that will restrict civil rights for a while but help bring order and unite the country”.	The personal opinion of a unit fighter is presented as a threat to Ukraine’s political leadership and casts doubt on the rule of law in the country.
This disciplinarian streak was visible in the battalion. Drinking is strictly forbidden. “One time there was a guy who got drunk, but the commander beat him in his face and legs until he could not move; then he was kicked out,” recalled one fighter proudly.	According to the law, a contracted fighter in a unit cannot be “expelled” from the unit; disciplinary actions, such as financial penalties, can be applied instead. The fighter was likely referring to a recruit undergoing basic training who consumed alcoholic beverages during training, despite the prohibition. Demonstrating low moral and volitional qualities, a low level of discipline, and grossly violating subordination, the recruit was expelled from the basic training course and was not allowed to proceed with selection into the unit.
Other volunteer battalions have also come under the spotlight. This week, Amnesty International called on the Ukrainian government to investigate rights abuses and possible executions by the Aidar, another battalion.	The creative technique of parallel editing is used to highlight imaginary war crimes by Azov and to create a comprehensive negative image of the “volunteer battalions” through generalization.
“The failure to stop abuses and possible war crimes by volunteer battalions risks significantly aggravating tensions in the east of the country and undermining the proclaimed intentions of the new Ukrainian authorities to strengthen and uphold the rule of law more broadly,” said Salil Shetty, Amnesty International secretary general, in Kiev.	The Russian interpretation of “volunteer battalions” as a threat to the rule of law and political stability in the country. A quote from an Amnesty International representative, who at the same time interacted with pro-Russian terrorists in temporarily uncontrolled territories, further emphasizes this pro-Russian leitmotif.
Fighters from the battalion told the Guardian last month they expected a “new revolution” in Ukraine that would bring a more decisive military leader to power, in sentiments similar to those of many Azov fighters.	The personal opinion of a unit fighter is presented as a threat to Ukraine’s political leadership.
Despite the desire of many in the Azov to bring violence to Kiev when the war in the east is over, the battalion receives funding and assistance from the governor of Donetsk region, the oligarch Serhiy Taruta.	The statement of a single fighter is presented as the position of the majority of fighters and almost as the position of all of Azov. The status of “oligarch” Taruta is also mentioned, even though, at the time in 2014, he was the head of the Donetsk Regional State Administration, to emphasize that Azov is uncontrollable and essentially a “private army.”
President Petro Poroshenko will be killed in a matter of months, Dmitry said, and a dictator will come to power.	The personal opinion of a unit fighter is presented as a threat to Ukraine’s political leadership.
“What are the police going to do? They could not do anything against the peaceful protesters on Maidan; they are hardly going to withstand armed fighting units.”	The personal opinion of a unit fighter is presented as a threat to Ukraine’s political leadership.

Ukraine underplays role of far-right in conflict

BBC
December 13, 2014
Author: David Stern

Thesis	Refutation
the new leaders in Kiev	The Russian transliteration of Ukraine’s capital, “Kiev.”
They claim that Ukrainian politics are completely fascist-free. This, too, is plain wrong. As a result, the question of the presence of the far-right in Ukraine remains a highly sensitive issue, one which top officials and the media shy away from. No-one wants to provide fuel to the Russian propaganda machine.	The artistic dramatization in the text reinforces the impression of a nationalist and neo-Nazi deep state in Ukraine.
But this blanket denial also has its dangers, since it allows the ultra-nationalists to fly under the radar. Many Ukrainians are unaware that they exist, or even what a neo-Nazi or fascist actually is, or what they stand for.	The author’s xenophobic thesis effectively accuses Ukrainians of having a low level of political culture and education, positioning himself as a “enlightener.”
This hyper-sensitivity and stonewalling were on full display after President Petro Poroshenko presented a Ukrainian passport to someone who, according to human rights activists, is a “Belarusian neo-Nazi”.	Accusations of neo-Nazism lack references, quotes with attribution, or sources that would provide sufficient evidence to support the legitimacy of these accusations.
Serhiy Korotkykh was among the fighters surrounded inside the wreck of Donetsk airport terminal	The information does not correspond to reality.
Top Ukrainian officials then rejected as defamatory any claims that Mr Korotkykh had neo-Nazi ties.	The author of the article implicitly criticizes and accuses the Ukrainian political elite of flirting with “neo-Nazis.”
Nevertheless, the fact is, neo-Nazis are indeed a fixture in Ukraine’s new political landscape, albeit in small numbers.	The author portrays Azov as a player on the political scene by citing an example of one of the fighters from the battalion’s first formation, Serhiy Korotkykh, while the unit was and remains a part of the Ukrainian military.
As Mr Korotkykh’s case demonstrates, the ultra-nationalists have proven to be effective and dedicated fighters in the brutal war in the east against Russian-backed separatists and Russian forces, whose numbers also include a large contingent from Russia’s far right.	Shifting the focus. First and foremost, Korotkykh had prior combat experience and the necessary knowledge of military strategy, which allowed the unit to achieve several tactical advantages in the then battalion’s sector of responsibility.
The Azov battalion seems to enjoy the support of several top officials. Run by the extremist Patriot of Ukraine organisation, which considers Jews and other minorities «sub-human”, and calls for a white, Christian crusade against them, it sports three Nazi symbols on its insignia: a modified Wolf’s Hook, a black sun (or “Hakensonne”) and the title Black Corps, which was used by the Waffen SS.	The Russian interpretation of Azov’s symbols as an allusion to the “Wolfsangel.” A mistaken interpretation regarding the unit’s command by Andrii Biletskyi, although at the time of writing, Ihor Mykhailenko had already become the commander of the Azov Regiment. Andrii Biletskyi himself became a member of the Ukrainian parliament, winning a majority vote in a Kyiv district, and resigned from his position as the commander of the military unit.
The Azov battalion seems to enjoy the support of several top officials.	The Azov Battalion, and later the Azov Regiment, were formed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was headed for a long time by Arsen Avakov. The phenomenon of Azov as a highly motivated unit was naturally of interest to the head of the ministry. However, emphasizing “patronage” is a clear manipulation. As is evident in 2024, Azov continues to exist, fight, and develop even after Arsen Avakov’s resignation and the loss of public positions by Vadym Troyan and Serhiy Korotkykh.
Experts say the Azov Battalion, which has been widely reported on in the West, has damaged Ukraine’s image and bolsters Russia’s information campaign.	The author confused cause and effect. Russian propaganda has not only created a distorted picture of reality but has literally created a parallel media reality in which Azov is still a “battalion,” operating as an uncontrollable “militia” and openly ideological and misanthropic. Is Azov itself to blame for the media clichés attributed to it by the opposing side? The question is rhetorical.
And although Ukraine is emphatically not run by fascists, far-right extremists seem to be making inroads by other means, as in the country’s police department.	A flawed, biased thesis and a dangerous generalization.
Ukraine’s public is grossly under-informed about this. The question is, why doesn’t anyone want to tell them?	Another xenophobic and condescending thesis by the author, positioning himself above Ukrainians and devaluing Ukraine’s political culture and the education of its people.

Ukrainian Far-Right Fighters, White Supremacists Trained by Major European Security Firm

Bellingcat
August 30, 2018
Author: Oleksiy Kuzmenko

Ukraine’s controversial Azov Regiment, also known as the Azov Battalion, which has been integrated into the Ukrainian National Guard in Mariupol	The author of the material does not understand the structural distinctions between the military units of Ukraine’s defense forces. Azov held the status of a “battalion” from May to September 2014, after which the unit’s size was expanded to a regiment, along with an expansion of its logistical base.
to members of the Azov-linked “National Corps”	Azov is a military unit subordinated to the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU), and any political engagement by the defense forces is prohibited. The “National Corps” is a political party founded by the first commander of Azov, Andrii Biletskyi, which includes several former Azov servicemen who decided not to continue their military service and instead pursue a political career. The “National Corps” has no direct connection to Azov.
Azov’s political patron	Arsen Avakov was the Minister of Internal Affairs, to whom the National Guard of Ukraine is subordinated according to the law. As one of the successful units, Azov was and remains a source of pride for the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVS). Calling Avakov a “political patron” is a clear manipulation and an unnecessary politicization of the unit.
It’s under Avakov that Azov was incorporated into the National Guard in a move that, although presented as means to defuse the ultra-nationalist battalion, led to its explosive growth and branching out into the National Corps political party and increasingly assertive National Militia street movement.	The journalistic cliché of an “Azov movement” has nothing to do with reality.
Andrii Biletskyi is the head of Azov movement	The journalistic cliché of an “Azov movement” has nothing to do with reality.
he cultivated Azov from a ragtag group of poorly-armed militants and soccer hooligans into a large three-pronged movement, and an aggressively expanding political and street movement with mostly unchecked ambitions	The journalistic cliché of an “Azov movement” has nothing to do with reality. The politicization of Azov is a typical manipulation that plays into the hands of Russian propaganda narratives.
the company provided services to the controversial Azov Regiment	The author of the article engages in dangerous generalization, as even the author himself confirms in his material, EUSECA conducted private training for some former Azov fighters and held a three-day Boot Camp for one course of Azov regiment recruits.
Sergiy Korotkih is one of Azov’s combat commanders	Serhiy Korotkykh was part of Azov only during the summer military campaign of 2014 as an unofficial volunteer (not formally enlisted). His subsequent activities are unrelated to and unknown to Azov.
the National Militia, a street branch of the Azov movement	The journalistic cliché of an “Azov movement” has nothing to do with reality. “National Druzhyny” is a separate initiative by former (not current) Azov servicemen.
white supremacist and neo-Nazi members of the Azov Regiment	This is manipulation and a dangerous generalization that has no basis in reality.
Azov-linked violent far-right organizations	Azov, as a military unit, does not and cannot have any affiliated or subordinate far-right organizations.
The National Militia is Azov’s aggressively expanding street branch	This is a deliberate manipulation and politicization of Azov. “National Druzhyny” is a separate initiative by former (not current) Azov servicemen.
the Azov Regiment, a military formation long mired in controversy because of its far-right ideology, along with credible accusations from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of Azov members and leaders committing and allowing serious human rights abuses.	Conscious manipulation. The mentioned documents do not provide sufficient concrete evidence regarding the involvement of Azov servicemen in committing war crimes. The first case describes mistreatment by “fighters of Azov and Donbas.” The second case describes the detention by Azov fighters of a pro-Russian agent due to informing his handlers from the so-called “DPR” about the location of Ukrainian defense forces, with a delay in bringing charges. The third case describes mistreatment of a detainee by the “SBU and Azov.” In the first and third cases, the actual role of Azov fighters is unclear, considering that in 2014, pro-Russian terrorists might have referred to all volunteer battalions and sometimes even Ukrainian defense forces as “Azov.” In the second case, the abuse of power should have been investigated by the military prosecutor’s office in accordance with established procedures. Therefore, the formulation of “credible accusations” remains questionable, undoubtedly biased, and emotionally charged.At the same time, there is credible evidence of numerous war crimes committed against Azov fighters during the defense of Mariupol in 2022, including the use of “filtration measures” against family members of servicemen and former servicemen of the unit. The most striking crime against human rights is the notorious terrorist attack on Azov prisoner of war fighters in the Olenivka colony, which resulted in the deaths of at least 53 unarmed fighters.
Azov’s street branch, the National Militia organization	Deliberate manipulation and politicization of Azov. “National Druzhyny” is a separate initiative by former (not current) Azov servicemen.
Azov is often described in the media as a military formation, but its leaders speak of it as a multifaceted movement. The most well-known part of Azov is its military wing, the Azov Regiment, but it also includes a political wing, the National Corps party, and a street wing, the National Militia.	The journalistic cliché of an “Azov movement” has nothing to do with reality. Any political initiatives by former Azov servicemen are unrelated to Azov after the initiators are discharged from the unit. Any socio-political activities of such individuals are subsequently regulated by the current legislation. While in service, military personnel cannot participate in political processes or be founders of any political formations.
Members of Azov movement appear to flow between three branches with ease and all three organizations pursue the same ultra-nationalist, far-right political ideology.	The journalistic cliché of an “Azov movement” has nothing to do with reality. Any political initiatives by former Azov servicemen are unrelated to Azov after the initiators are discharged from the unit. Any socio-political activities of such individuals are subsequently regulated by the current legislation. While in service, military personnel cannot participate in political processes or be founders of any political formations.
Matthew Schaaf, director of Freedom House’s Ukrainian Office, has described the rise of Azov’s National Militia to public prominence and its ambitions as “scary”.	Deliberate manipulation and politicization of Azov. “National Druzhyny” is a separate initiative by former (not current) Azov servicemen.
National Corps leaders at the site included Rodion Kudriashov, who is a prominent Azov Regiment combat commander	Rodion Kudryashov was a serviceman in Azov, and after being discharged from service, he began pursuing his own political career. However, after his discharge, he had no connection to Azov.
Kudriashov’s multitude of roles with the Azov movement illustrates how fluidly Azov activists flow between their various positions as military commanders and civic activists.	Current legislation allows former servicemen to participate in the socio-political process, including guaranteeing their rights to be elected and join political parties. Azov, as a military unit, cannot control or restrict the rights of its former servicemen to express a proactive civic position. However, after their discharge, Azov cannot be held responsible for these individuals.
Azov’s political branch, the National Corps, and its satellite organization GO Zirka	Deliberate manipulation and politicization of Azov. “National Corps” and “Civic Organization ZIRKA” are separate initiatives by former (not current) Azov servicemen.
GO Zirka, which is involved in both veteran and street politics, is a satellite of the Azov movement and is closely aligned with the National Corps and the National Militia.	Deliberate manipulation and politicization of Azov. “National Corps,” “National Druzhyny,” and “Civic Organization ZIRKA” are separate initiatives by former (not current) Azov servicemen.

Ukraine Should Beware the Azov Extremists

The Moscow Times
July 20, 2015
Author: Josh Cohen

The U.S. House of Representatives unanimously passed an amendment to the U.S. military budget prohibiting training and support for the extremist paramilitary Azov battalion.	Azov is a structural unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Azov was founded as a special Forces patrol service battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on May 5, 2014, in the city of Mariupol. It cannot have any “paramilitary” status, as it has been a structured military unit from the very beginning.
The Azov is the military wing of the Social-National Assembly of Ukraine (SNA), a party founded by avowed white supremacist Andrii Biletskyi	Azov is subordinate to the leadership of the National Guard of Ukraine. The first commander of Azov, Andrii Biletskyi, resigned from military service to pursue a political career.
The Azov’s logo is an inverted Wolfsangel, which was a widely used symbol in Nazi Germany	The Azov chevron is a symbol that has been popular in Ukraine since the 1990s, representing the “Idea of the Nation.” It appears in the symbolism of many Ukrainian socio-political movements and organizations. The “Idea of the Nation” symbol signifies the primacy of the national liberation struggle’s interests over individual interests, a typical voluntarist interpretation of the mission of youth organizations for the peoples of Eastern Europe.
You would imagine the post-Maidan government would disavow such a group — but you would be wrong. As if to rebuke Conyers, politician and businessman Arsen Avakov and Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksandr Turchinov just awarded soldiers of the Azov medals in a 30-minute ceremony in the city of Mariupol	Azov was one of the key players in the fight against pro-Russian terrorists and in securing the largest city in the Azov region from occupation in 2014. The recognition of the unit’s combat merits has taken place at the highest level since its inception, regardless of biased journalistic interpretations.
Indeed, the Azov enjoys the enthusiastic sponsorship of Avakov himself, and he aggressively defended the Azov recently, describing the Wolfsangel as “part of the city emblem in many European cities,” stating “anyone who’s going to tell me that these guys preach Nazi views, wear the swastika and so on, are bare-faced liars and fools.”	Arsen Avakov was the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the time, under which the National Guard of Ukraine (NGU) and Azov, in particular, are subordinated. To call him a “sponsor” is to show one’s incompetence, as the funding of the unit was carried out in accordance with the established procedure within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Avakov is not the only one to downplay the revolution’s extremist elements. In their zeal to resist the Russian-sponsored war on Ukraine, even many Euromaidan activists overlook or play down nationalist elements within the Maidan movement.	A pro-Russian narrative is evident in characterizing the participants of the 2013-2014 Euromaidan as “extremists.”
The reaction to Western criticism of Ukraine’s new law criminalizing criticism of two World War II-era nationalist organizations — the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) — which collaborated with the Nazis is a case in point. While the OUN-UPA fought both the Soviets and the Germans, they favored an ethnically homogenous greater Ukraine, and were involved in the Holocaust and the ethnic cleansing of Poles in western Ukraine. Unfortunately, despite overwhelming evidence documented by numerous historians regarding the OUN-UPA’s involvement in pogroms and mass ethnic violence, many Ukrainians simply label this “Kremlin propaganda” on the assumption that if Moscow asserts something the opposite must be true.	The Russian narrative of denying Ukrainian national history.

How a Far-Right Battalion Became a Part of Ukraine’s National Guard

Vice
February 16, 2022
Author: Tim Hume

The Azov Battalion, which bears a Wolfsangel logo, trains civilians in Ukraine	The claim that the Wolfsangel is depicted on Azov’s chevron is inspired by Russian propaganda and does not correspond to reality. The symbol on the chevron is a monogram of the letters “I” and “N,” representing “Idea of the Nation,” which reflects the unit’s fighters’ dedication to defending the Ukrainian nation and their willingness to sacrifice their lives for its freedom. Here, the nation is understood in terms of political, not ethnic, community.
Viral photographs of an elderly Ukrainian woman handling an AK-47 during a combat training exercise have thrust Ukraine’s far-right forces into the spotlight.	Azov is a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, which is under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. The term “far-right forces” is completely incorrect and discredits the Defense and Security Forces of Ukraine.
But the picture took on more sinister undertones when it emerged the combat training was hosted by Azov, an extremist movement notorious for its far-right ideology.	This is a manipulation using the Russian propaganda narrative about the existence of an “Azov movement.”
The presence of far-right elements within Ukraine’s self-defence forces has been seized on by the Kremlin in a bid to smear Ukrainian forces as “fascists,” and has been an issue for Kyiv’s Western allies, although many Ukrainians dismiss the debate as overblown by Western observers.	The narrative about the presence of “far-right elements” in the Ukrainian defense forces is part of an aggressive Russian policy that denies Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. According to the Russian view of history, any supporters of Ukraine’s independence are “far-right” and “neo-Nazis.”
The controversy has largely centred around Azov – a militant ultranationalist movement with neo-Nazi roots that was officially incorporated into Ukraine’s National Guard in 2014, after playing a major role in fighting pro-Russian forces in key engagements such as the Battle for Mariupol. The sprawling movement consists of an official regiment within the National Guard; its own fringe political party, National Corps; and a paramilitary group, known as National Militia, which “patrols” Ukrainian streets enforcing its own brand of justice. Members of the group have been linked to a series of violent attacks on minorities in recent years.	Azov is not a militant ultranationalist movement with neo-Nazi roots. Azov is a unit within the National Guard of Ukraine, which is subordinate to the military-political command of Ukraine, just like any other brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or the National Guard. Azov does not have its “own fringe political party, National Corps, or a paramilitary group known as National Militia.” These political projects were created by some Azov veterans after they completed their service in the unit and cannot be associated with Azov in any way. Ukrainian law prohibits servicemen, let alone entire units, from being members of political parties or movements.
The movement’s extremist ideology has never been much of a secret. Its fighters have been photographed covered with far-right tattoos and insignia, while the regiment is identifiable by the Nazi Wolfsangel logo on their uniforms (the group has denied the symbol carries a Nazi connotation). And the movement is driven by figures with deep roots in Ukraine’s extreme-right scene.	There is manipulation regarding the Russian interpretation of the unit’s symbols as the “Wolfsangel.” Recruitment into the unit is carried out through a basic training course (BZVP), which involves a set of strenuous physical and psychological challenges designed to filter out individuals with low moral and volitional qualities. Thus, the recruitment of volunteers is based on a strict selection process with clear criteria. Ukrainian law does not prohibit people with tattoos from joining the defense forces. Therefore, the presence of tattoos is not considered a factor when joining or during service unless it interferes with the performance of duties. This set of “accusations” against the unit appears to be exaggerated by Russian propagandists. Is there objective data on tattoos among servicemen in other countries’ armies? We are convinced that nowhere else in the world is this given as much attention as Russian propagandists give to Ukrainian soldiers.
Andrii Biletskyi, the Azov Batallion’s first commander and later a National Corps parliamentarian, previously led the neo-Nazi paramilitary organisation “Patriot of Ukraine,” and once stated in 2010 that it was the Ukrainian nation’s mission to “lead the white races of the world in a final crusade… against Semite-led Untermenschen [subhumans].”	Andrii Biletskyi has had no connection to the Azov military unit since his discharge from service in the fall of 2014.
“There is no arguing about [the extremist ideology], because you can see the pictures of guys with swastikas,” Mikael Skillt, a Swedish former neo-Nazi who travelled to Ukraine in 2014 to become a foreign volunteer for the far-right regiment, told VICE World News last year.	A military unit cannot have an ideological characterization. The quoted statement is the private opinion of a former unit fighter.
It was volunteer militias such as Azov and Right Sector – whose members included fighters drawn from the ultranationalist and far-right hooligan networks – that stepped into the breach, making a name for themselves in the fierce fighting for the city of Mariupol, and carving out a reputation as valiant defenders of the nation.	Azov is a structural unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Azov was established as a special Forces patrol service battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on May 5, 2014, in the city of Mariupol. Azov has never been a “militia” because it has been a structured military unit from the beginning.
The Azov Battalion became formally incorporated into Ukraine’s National Guard in late 2014 as a result of its role in the conflict, bringing its extremists onto the government payroll under the auspices of the Interior Ministry. This gave the movement an unlikely degree of official legitimacy.	The claim that Azov gained official legitimacy at the end of 2014 is manipulative and false. From its first day of establishment on May 5, 2014, Azov was under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The term “movement” in the context of Azov is also a propagandist Russian cliché. Azov is a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, not part of any “movement.”
“They were transformed from basically a bunch of far-right thugs. That’s how they were seen before 2014: irrelevant numerically and politically,”	The Russian narrative portraying Ukrainian nationalists as “neo-Nazis.”
Azov’s formal status within the National Guard – and the movement’s active promotion of its ideology, and the building of ties with right-wing extremist groups elsewhere in the world – has proven an ongoing issue for Kyiv’s allies, and been a gift to Russian propaganda.	This does not correspond to reality. Azov has no documented attempts to recruit foreign volunteers, especially not ideologically motivated groups or political organizations of volunteers, as it is legally impossible to formalize them within the unit. After the start of the full-scale invasion, this possibility arose, and as of spring 2024, Azov has up to 20 foreign volunteers serving as instructors with military service experience in their own countries’ armies and relevant combat experience.
The U.S. government – which has described Azov’s political party, National Corps, as a “nationalist hate group” – has banned any of its military aid to Ukraine from reaching the movement	The ban on transferring weapons to Azov from the United States, which resulted from the successful activities of Russian propaganda in the West and had been in place since 2017, was lifted in June 2024. At that time, the relevant U.S. authorities conducted a review of Azov, which found no evidence supporting accusations of human rights violations leveled against Azov. Now, Azov, like other Ukrainian units, can receive American military aid. Moreover, the relevant amendments to U.S. consolidated appropriations laws, which prohibited the transfer of weapons to Azov, did not use the wording “Azov’s political party, National Corps, as a ‘nationalist hate group’.” Azov does not have its own political party and is not affiliated with any political parties or movements.
Azov’s political party, National Corps	The National Corps is not and has never been Azov’s “political party.” This party was founded by some veterans of the unit who began their political activities after leaving Azov. According to Ukrainian law, servicemen are not allowed to engage in political activities or be members of any political parties, organizations, or movements. Azov strictly adheres to all Ukrainian laws.
“The question remains: Do you want to have a force that has a Wolfsangel in its logo within your National Guard?” Rękawek said.	The Russian interpretation of Azov’s symbols as an allusion to the “Wolfsangel.”

Ukraine: Batallion Backed by Jewish Billionaire Sent to Fight Pro-Russian Militias

Algemeiner
June 24, 2014
Author: Dave Bender

Despite cease-fire declarations, pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian militias are still reportedly clashing at several locations in south-eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian military units, including Azov, which opposed pro-Russian separatists and Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, were not “militias.” These were official units of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and, in the case of Azov, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

Among those going into battle from the Ukrainian side are some 500 trained fighters in the self-declared Azov battalion, backed by Jewish energy magnate and Dnipropetrovsk region governor, Igor Kolomoisky

Azov was created by an official order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine on May 5, 2014, as a special forces battalion. In less than a year, Azov became a separate special forces detachment within the National Guard of Ukraine. Thus, it was not “self-proclaimed,” as the author baselessly claims. At the beginning of the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, some businessmen supported volunteers who were ready to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by providing them with equipment, food, and medicine. However, there is no evidence that Ihor Kolomoisky supported Azov.

Ukrainian Far-Right Extremists Receive State Funds to Teach “Patriotism”

Bellingcat
July 16, 2019
Authors: Oleksiy Kuzmenko, Michael Colborne 

A number of branches of Ukrainian far-right groups, including National Corps, the political wing of the Azov movement	The “National Corps” is not the “political wing of the Azov movement.”
Azov’s National Corps	The “National Corps” is not Azov’s. It is a political party separate from Azov, created, among others, by Azov veterans who were no longer servicemen in the unit by the time they began their political activities.
Azov’s street wing National Militia	The “National Militia” has never been the “street wing” of Azov. As an official military unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov, in accordance with Ukrainian law, cannot have any political parties or “street wings.”
Azov battalion (predecessor to both National Corps and Azov Regiment)	The Azov Battalion was not the “precursor” to the National Corps party. The activities of this political party are in no way related to Azov. The National Corps was created, in particular, by Azov veterans who were no longer servicemen of Azov at the time the party was founded.

Right-wing Azov Battalion emerges as a controversial defender of Ukraine

The Washington Post
April 6, 2022
Authors: Sudarsan Raghavan, Loveday Morris, Claire Parker and David L. Stern

Invisible, yet palpable, was the shadow cast over this new regiment, like every unit of the Azov Battalion. Alexi Suliyma knew about its ugly past, but he joined anyway.	This article is not about Azov but rather a unit created after the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. Among its founders and first fighters were some Azov veterans who had completed their service in the unit before 2022. Several of these newly created units within territorial defense in different cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro) were named using the word “Azov.” This was a personal initiative of these veterans; Azov’s command did not initiate the use of these names. The repetition of names created confusion in the media. Over time, all these units were officially renamed and given their new names.
“I never knew them to be Nazis or fascists, never heard them make calls for the Third Reich.”	The journalist’s manipulation aims to force them to defend themselves against blatantly pro-Russian accusations, which are always deemed “insufficient.”
Of all the Ukrainian forces fighting the invading Russian military, the most controversial is the Azov Battalion.	The “controversy” surrounding Azov is the result of successful Russian propaganda, which has managed to create an image in the minds of some people in the West that Azov is a “neo-Nazi” unit.
A training site for members of the Azov Battalion to practice shooting live bullets in Kyiv on March 24.	During this time, Azov was defending Mariupol under siege, and the unit’s personnel were not in Kyiv. As already mentioned, the article is not about Azov but rather about Azov veterans who, after February 24, 2022, created new units unrelated to Azov.
But the battalion’s far-right nationalist ideology has raised concerns that it is attracting extremists, including white supremacist neo-Nazis, who could pose a future threat.	Azov has never had, nor could it have, any “far-right nationalist ideology.” As a structural unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov strictly adheres to Ukrainian law, which prohibits servicemen from engaging in any political activities, as well as using Nazi symbols and promoting hateful ideologies.
The battalion’s own leaders and fighters concede that some extremists remain in their ranks, but it has evolved since its emergence in 2014 during the conflict in eastern Ukraine against Russian forces and Moscow-backed separatists.	Since its establishment on May 5, 2014, Azov has existed as a special forces patrol service battalion under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was expanded to a regiment in September 2014 and became part of the National Guard of Ukraine on September 17, 2014. No one who poses a threat to national security can serve in a military unit, so the term “extremists” is clearly an artistic exaggeration and deliberate manipulation.
Under pressure from U.S. and Ukrainian authorities, the Azov battalion has toned down its extremist elements.	It is clear manipulation; there were no “extremists” serving in Azov, as mentioned above.
In an interview, the force’s co-founder and top commander, Col. Andrii Biletskiy, did not dispute his far-right ultraconservative leanings or the presence of some extremists in his units.	Andrii Biletskyi resigned from his position in Azov in the fall of 2014. Since then, his influence on the unit has been limited.
Michael Colborne, who monitors and researches the far right and wrote a book about the Azov, said that he “wouldn’t call it explicitly a neo-Nazi movement.”	Michael Colborne wrote a book about Azov, in which he barely mentions the Azov military unit itself, focusing on the activities of select former servicemen of the unit. He also did not seek comments from the unit’s press service to objectively cover the unit’s position.
“There are clearly neo-Nazis within its ranks,” said Colborne, author of “From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right.”	The term “Azov movement” is a propaganda cliché that demonizes Azov, presenting the unit as the combat wing of a large political project. In reality, there is only one unit of the National Guard of Ukraine — the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov. The political projects of former servicemen of the unit are in no way connected to Azov. Michael Colborne’s book effectively tarnishes the reputation of the combat unit while barely touching on the unit itself.
The Azov rose up initially in the spring of 2014 as a volunteer force launched by the ultranationalist Patriot of Ukraine and the extremist Social National Assembly.	This is deliberate manipulation and the result of Russian disinformation. Azov was formed from Ukrainian patriots, including football ultras, nationalists from nationalist organizations, pro-Ukrainian activists from the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas, and well-known public activists who took a strong pro-state stance.
The paramilitary unit was initially funded by wealthy Ukrainians and assisted by the nation’s then-interior minister, and the investment soon paid off.	The Azov Battalion, and later the Azov Regiment, were formed as part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was headed for a long time by Arsen Avakov. The phenomenon of Azov as a highly motivated unit was naturally of interest to the head of the ministry. However, emphasizing “patronage” is a clear manipulation. As is evident in 2024, Azov continues to exist, fight, and develop even after Arsen Avakov’s resignation.
Transnational support for Azov has been wide, and Ukraine has emerged as a new hub for the far right across the world.	Azov, as a highly motivated and effective military unit, has become an interesting phenomenon in the modern world, both for military observers and political experts. Azov has intrigued many ideological groups as an example of courage and determination in defending the national interests of their country and dedication to defending the home country.
Men from across three continents, including members of American and European extremist groups, have been documented to join the Azov units to seek combat experience, engage in similar ideology and as a training ground for operations in their home countries.	There is no documented case of Azov volunteers using their combat skills in other countries. Foreign volunteers of Azov obtained Ukrainian citizenship; some of them continued their service in the unit.
Despite their military successes, the Azov continued to be criticized as adherents to neo-Nazi ideology. Even as they have consistently denied any Nazi affiliations, their uniforms and tattoos on many of their fighters display a number of fascist and Nazi symbols, including swastikas and SS symbols. In 2015, Andrii Diachenko, the spokesperson for the regiment at the time, told USA Today that 10 to 20 percent of Azov’s recruits were Nazis.	This is conscious journalistic manipulation. An obviously ironic comment by an individual unit fighter is regarded as factual statistics regarding the supposed ideological beliefs in Azov. No sociological surveys on private ideological beliefs obviously exist. Servicemen are prohibited from holding any beliefs that could threaten national security.
In the following years, U.N. human rights officials accused the Azov regiment of violating international humanitarian laws;	No such case has been documented.
Today, the Azov battalion is getting much praise for strong stand against Russia in Mariupol. The battalion’s various Telegram channels post news of their exploits in addition to battlefield videos, detailing their victories in gruesome detail.	On May 5, 2014, Azov was created as a special forces patrol police battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Thus, Azov was under Ukrainian control from the very beginning. In the fall of 2014, Azov was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine, becoming a separate special forces detachment. As of February 2023, Azov is the 12th Special Forces Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine. Journalists criticize the direct duties of the unit’s press service. In the absence of electricity, communication, and independent journalists (the last journalists left Mariupol at the end of March 2022), Azov’s press service was practically the only source of information about the events on the ground from the Ukrainian side.
Unlike them, the broader Azov political movement, which has a stronger extremist bent, is far less popular, judging by their performance in Ukraine’s last elections.	The term “Azov movement” is a propaganda cliché that demonizes Azov, presenting the unit as the combat wing of a large political project. In reality, there is only one unit of the National Guard of Ukraine — the 12th Special Forces Brigade “Azov.” There is no “political wing of Azov.”
Despite slickly produced videos that gave the impression of a massive movement, National Corps, the Azov political arm, won only about 2 percent of the vote, even though they ran on a united slate with other far-right parties.	The term “Azov movement” is a propaganda cliché that demonizes Azov, presenting the unit as the combat wing of a large political project. In reality, there is only one unit of the National Guard of Ukraine — the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov. There is no “political wing of Azov.”
The Azov battalion is also not what it was in 2014.	On May 5, 2014, Azov was created as a special Forces patrol police battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Thus, Azov was under Ukrainian control from the very beginning. In the fall of 2014, Azov was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine, becoming a separate special Forces detachment. As of February 2023, Azov is the 12th Special Forces Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine. Over its 10 years of existence, Azov has evolved into one of the most combat-ready, highly effective, and highly motivated units of the Ukrainian military.
The Azov forces today, said Biletskiy, now include writers and other liberals, even members of the extreme left and antifascists.	The term “Azov movement” is a propaganda cliché that demonizes Azov, portraying the unit as the combat wing of a large political project. In reality, there is only a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine—the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov.
He enlisted in Azov because he shared its far-right nationalist ideology.	Within Azov, there is a Khorunzhy (ensign) service responsible for maintaining high moral and volitional qualities, motivation, and a high level of moral and psychological support among the personnel. What journalists and Western commentators refer to as an “ultra-right ideology” is merely basic humanitarian education, knowledge of national history, cultural studies, and a high level of political culture among the average Azov fighter.
Biletskiy said they are trying to weed out the neo-Nazi tattoos and other symbols among Azov fighters, but in the current war he cannot afford to lose any soldier because of political ideology, left or right.	Andrii Biletskyi resigned from Azov in the fall of 2014. Since then, his influence on the unit has been limited.

The Christchurch shooting, Eastern Europe’s far-right and a ‘cherry-picked reading of history’

ABC
10 Apr 2019
Author: Michael Colborne

I’d seen it on the paraphernalia of the far-right Azov movement (black sun)	The occult symbol “Black Sun” is not present in Azov’s insignia. Wearing patches with this symbol, or any other symbols associated with extremism, is strictly prohibited in Azov.
Ukraine is home to a resurgent far-right that uses the same symbolism as the Christchurch shooter, but it hasn’t been mentioned much over the past few weeks.	The symbols used by extremists in various countries have no relation to Azov.
Ukraine is home to the Azov movement, a far-right movement originally formed in 2014 as the Azov Battalion to fight Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine. It quickly earned controversy as a place that accepted open neo-Nazis into its ranks.	The term “Azov movement” is a propaganda cliché that demonizes Azov, portraying the unit as the combat wing of a large political project. In reality, there is only the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine. The political projects of former servicemen of the unit are in no way connected to Azov.
Five years later it’s become a multi-pronged movement with a political party (National Corps), a street militia and an infrastructure that offers everything from youth camps to mixed martial arts training sessions.	The “National Corps” and other projects of this political party were created by some former Azov servicemen after they had completed their service in the unit. These political projects are in no way connected to Azov. According to Ukrainian law, servicemen are not allowed to engage in political activities.
In the manifesto, I saw so much of what I’ve become used to seeing from writing about the Azov movement.	The use of the propagandist term “Azov movement.”
A need for Europe to undergo a rebirth or renewal — or “Reconquista” in Azov’s terms. Talk about ethno-nationalist homelands and ethno-states. A deep disdain for democracy. References to Valhalla, the place in Norse mythology where warriors go after they die in battle and a common neo-Nazi trope. Talk about a need to march through a country’s institutions, to play a longer-term game and seek positions of power and influence in society.	The term “reconquista” was used in the political activities of the “National Corps” party, not by Azov. Azov does not advocate for an ethno-national state — its ranks include representatives of various ethnic groups: Georgians, Ukrainians, Jews, Crimean Tatars, Russians, Armenians, and others. The influence of Scandinavian mythology and history on modern warrior culture is evident in all Western countries and cannot be interpreted as “neo-Nazism.” There is no documented case of Azov’s command or fighters sabotaging orders from Ukraine’s military-political leadership.
the cheap obscurantist polish Azov’s leading lights use to dress up their ideas and downplay the extreme nature of them	As a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov has only one idea and one goal — to defend Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.
And that black sun once again; its dozen of what look like lightning bolts springing out from the middle. I see it on Azov’s patches, being worn by soldiers, and even used as decoration in one of their social centres. I saw it last night as several hundred Azov movement members, many of them teenagers, marched through the Ukrainian capital; I lost count of how many black sun patches and tattoos I saw.	As mentioned above, the use of the “Black Sun” on patches is prohibited in Azov. Azov does not have “social centers.” The teenagers the author saw have no connection to Azov and were activists of political parties not related to Azov.
WotanJugend has connections with the Azov movement — you can buy WotanJugend shirts, emblazoned with black suns and runic imagery used by the SS, from a small shop inside Azov’s Cossack House in central Kiev.	“Cossack House” was a recruitment center for Azov only in 2014. After that, Azov was no longer based in this building. “WotanJugend” has no relation to Azov.
And WotanJugend knows about the Christchurch shooting.	The whole world knew about this terrorist attack. What does Azov have to do with it?
I won’t quote directly, but suffice to say these Ukraine-based neo-Nazis think the Christchurch tragedy was totally justified — for them, the shooter is a hero.	Who are these “Ukrainian neo-Nazis”? Who are these people? Where is even one name, statement, or quote? Azov has never made any official statements supporting any terrorist attacks. On the contrary, Azov has been defending the Ukrainian people from Russian terror for 10 years.
With supporters like these around the world, the Christchurch attacks likely won’t be the last act of far-right terror inspired by a global network of insidious ideas.	It is still unclear what this has to do with a Ukrainian military unit, which is part of the National Guard and includes representatives of various ethnicities and religious traditions. The author of the article did not provide any evidence of Azov members committing hate crimes or human rights violations, nor did they provide any official statement from Azov regarding the terrorist attack mentioned in the article.

Ukraine crisis: Inside the Mariupol base of the controversial Azov battalion

ABC
March 12, 2015
Author: Nicholas Lazaredes

The first thing you notice as you walk through the corridors of the Azov battalion’s base in Mariupol are the swastikas. There are many — painted on doors, adorning the walls and chalked onto the blackboards of this former school, now temporary headquarters for the Azov troops.	As becomes clear from the text, the author confused a swastika with Azov’s symbol, the “Idea of the Nation.” This is a monogram of the letters “I” and “N,” symbolizing the willingness of Azov members to fight for the Ukrainian people, even at the cost of their own lives. The concept of “Nation” here — since Azov includes representatives of various ethnic groups — is interpreted not in an ethnic sense, but in the context of a political nation.
It is a confronting sight and when I query the young soldier assigned to show me around he is quick to correct me, pointing out that the symbol is in fact a “modified swastika” — more like the letter N crossed with a straight line.	From this paragraph, it becomes clear that the author of the article failed to understand what the Azov symbol actually means.
When I point to another symbol of the Third Reich etched on the wall, that of Hitler’s “SS”, he simply shrugs and says: “We are nationalists, but we are not Nazis.”	In Azov, wearing and using any extremist symbols, including Nazi insignia, is prohibited. The author likely confused the symbols again and might have interpreted some runic inscription as an “SS” symbol. Ancient Germanic letters — runes — are often used by military personnel in various countries around the world due to the significant influence of Germanic-Scandinavian warrior culture.
The Azov battalion is a highly controversial Ukrainian paramilitary group that has drawn much criticism for its links to the far right. The imagery it has chosen to adopt hardly helps to allay concerns, but for my young guide it is a non-issue.	Azov is not a “paramilitary group,” but a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine. Its “controversial” nature is the result of Russian propaganda against the unit and the spread of fake news about Azov.
“Some journalists prefer to present us as Nazis. They look for any chance to discredit our regiment,” he said.	As we can see, by 2015, this had already become a constant problem for Azov fighters. Russian propaganda began working to discredit the unit almost immediately after its creation and after Azov’s first significant successes on the front — liberating Mariupol during the Shyrokyne offensive operation.
Like pro-Russian rebels, Ukrainian soldiers rarely provide their real names when talking to journalists, using platoon nicknames instead.	The use of call signs is standard practice in armies worldwide. Comparisons with pro-Russian separatists, whom the author gently calls “rebels,” creating a positive image of them in the reader’s mind, are entirely inappropriate. The vast majority of Azov fighters reveal their names and surnames when giving interviews to journalists. However, there are those who have relatives in territories temporarily occupied by Russians and do not want to endanger their loved ones because of their service in Azov. Therefore, they may introduce themselves to journalists by their call signs.
“Our battalion is comprised of conscious people who have a much higher Forces than just winning the war,” he said. “We want to build a new independent and sovereign Ukraine. That’s what makes us different from other military units.”	The opinion presented in the quote is the personal position of an individual fighter and should not be interpreted as the position of the unit. The main task of Azov as a military unit of the National Guard of Ukraine is to defend the Ukrainian people.
The Azov battalion is a volunteer military brigade that was formed last year in Mariupol, named after the sea on which the city is located.	Azov was formed as a special forces patrol service battalion under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Azov was indeed expanded to a brigade in terms of numbers, but this occurred in February 2023.
It is closely linked to the Social-National Assembly, an umbrella organisation to a collection of ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine, and many of Azov’s recruits are drawn by its perceived far right-wing ideology.	The fact that some of Azov’s first fighters used to be members of various political parties and social movements before joining the unit does not mean that Azov has a specific ideological bias.
Currently under the auspices of Ukraine’s interior ministry, there are deep concerns that arming right-wing paramilitary groups like Azov might backfire and present a future threat to the government, but Dancer says the fears are unfounded.	Azov has never sabotaged orders from Ukraine’s military-political command. Arsen Avakov, who was the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine at the time this article was written, repeatedly spoke positively about Azov, noting the high level of motivation and professionalism of the unit’s fighters.
Dancer had his last “brush with the enemy” less than a month ago on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol, near the village of Shyrokine, when his unit came under attack by rebel forces who he claims were mostly Russian.	The Russian narrative regarding the characterization of pro-Russian terrorists in Donbas as “rebels.”
Considered a traitor back home, Achtung said his motives were purely ideological.	Emphasizing the Russian narrative and calling him a “traitor” for fighting on Ukraine’s side is not only a violation of journalistic standards but also blatant bias in the stated formulation.
Achtung admits he has far-right leanings, expressing sympathy with Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups.	An individual’s opinion and their political preferences do not equal the position of the entire unit.
Natalya is quick to defend the integrity of the right-wing Azov brigade.	Azov is not a “right-wing brigade.” It is a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine that cannot and does not have any political affiliation. The unit includes supporters of various political ideologies.
Inside the battalion’s briefing room, Dancer shows me a small shrine dedicated to the Azov’s fallen comrades.	Preserving the memory of fallen comrades who gave their lives for Ukraine’s freedom is an important tradition in Azov.

Ukraine’s Azov Battalion Looks to Regroup and Clean Up Image

WSJ
June 5, 2022
Authors: Vivian Salama and Matthew Luxmoore

Three special-forces platoons from the Azov Regiment, a Ukrainian volunteer militia, fanned out in the woods outside this southern city to practice shooting and ambush tactics they plan to use against invading Russian forces.	The article is not about Azov, which was created in 2014 and was defending Mariupol at the time of publication, but rather about a unit that was formed at the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 by some Azov veterans who had already completed their service in the unit by then. Several such newly formed units within territorial defense in different cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro) used the word “Azov” in their names. This was a personal initiative of these veterans; the Azov command did not initiate the use of these names. The repetition of names created confusion in the media. Over time, all these units were officially renamed and received their own new names.As of June 2022, the Azov Regiment was in Russian captivity after ending the heroic defense of Mariupol.
After their regiment’s hard-fought but losing battle against Moscow’s forces in the port city of Mariupol	Azov did not “lose” the battle for Mariupol. The significance of successfully holding back much larger Russian forces in Mariupol for 86 days, 82 of which were under complete encirclement, was immense for Ukraine in the early months of the war. This allowed Ukraine time to regroup its forces, and Western allies were able to provide initial military aid. The Mariupol garrison surrendered from the Azovstal plant under orders from Ukraine’s top military-political leadership, having completed all the tasks assigned to them.
They are also working hard to shake their reputation as a far-right movement.	The journalistic manipulation regarding the “Azov movement” has no connection to the Azov military unit.
Azov’s widely hailed resistance in Mariupol, which resulted in hundreds of its fighters being taken as prisoners of war by Russia, has bolstered its image, even as the battalion continues to court controversy.	The author’s pro-Russian tone regarding the heroic defense of Mariupol by the garrison forces and the Azov Regiment, in particular, which became a symbol of Russian occupation in the early days of the war.
On Feb. 27, three days after Russia launched its invasion, Ukraine’s National Guard posted a video it said showed an Azov fighter dipping bullets in pig fat, a move apparently designed to intimidate any Muslim Chechens fighting on Russia’s side.	In the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, a large number of informational and psychological operations spread across the network, aiming to demoralize the enemy and destabilize the situation. At this point, it is impossible to determine who is depicted in the video mentioned in the article or for what purpose it was distributed. Azov includes representatives of various religious traditions, including Muslims.
Few would deny Azov’s origins are problematic. The group’s first commander, Andrii Biletskyi, joined Azov in 2014 after leading political groups that openly espoused neo-Nazi and white supremacist ideas. Mr. Biletskyi left in October 2016 to head National Corps, a new right-wing party aligned with the regiment.Mr. Biletskyi is still actively involved with Azov, maintaining regular contact with its members and participating in their training. He denies being an ethnic nationalist.	Andrii Biletskyi left Azov back in 2014. The National Corps party, which he later founded, was not connected to Azov, as Ukrainian law prohibits servicemen from engaging in any political activity.
Azov was formed as a volunteer battalion in Mariupol in 2014, a time when the Ukrainian army was in tatters. It brought together a ragtag group of fighters who successfully repelled an attack on the port city by Russian-backed separatists. It attracted a collection of disparate characters, among them amateur historians, battle reconstructors, neo-Nazis and hard-core soccer fans.	In the chaos of the first months of the war, some individuals who might have been supporters of various radical political ideologies could have ended up in Ukrainian volunteer units. However, it is incorrect to conclude that the entire units became “neo-Nazi” with their presence. Less than a year after its creation, Azov began to strictly screen those wishing to join the unit, and any supporters of radical political movements quickly left the unit.
That summer and fall, the men—instructed by trainers from the Georgian military—fended off further offensives by Russia’s proxy forces and began building their reputation as a formidable force.	Among the first instructors in Azov were representatives of various nationalities, including Georgians, who saw helping Ukrainian military personnel as their contribution to the fight against Russian imperialism, which also threatens their own countries. However, all of them were former servicemen of their respective countries. The wording used by the author is manipulative, creating the impression for the reader that Azov was deliberately, in the context of some conspiracy, trained by foreign active military personnel.
The influx of members who joined since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24 includes self-avowed nationalists, but Azov’s new fighters said they oppose fascism and don’t subscribe to any extremist views.	This is not about Azov, but about units created by Azov veterans in 2022.
Azov’s tainted reputation as a far-right group had contributed to that lack of equipment.	The ban on transferring weapons and military aid to Azov was lifted in June 2024, when the relevant American government agencies conducted an investigation that found no evidence of Azov fighters committing war crimes or violating human rights.
The lawmakers pointed to alleged incidents, cited by the United Nations, of detainee torture by Azov fighters. The U.N. has also raised concern more recently about “credible allegations” of torture by Ukrainian forces in the current war with Russia, including a video shared by the Azov Regiment showing Russian soldiers stripped to their underwear, with hands tied behind their back and eyes covered.	The aforementioned investigation concluded that there is no evidence of Azov servicemen violating human rights.
Today, Azov’s Kyiv Battalion has three U.S.-made Javelins. Mr. Kukharchuk said his fighters also have NLAW short-range antitank missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades, but what they need desperately are high-mobility artillery rocket systems, tanks, and most of all, artillery.	The discussion is not about Azov, which was created in 2014 and was defending Mariupol at the time of the article’s publication, but about a unit created at the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022 by some Azov veterans who had already completed their service in the unit. Several of these newly formed units within territorial defense in different cities (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro) used the name “Azov.” This was a personal initiative of these veterans; Azov’s command did not initiate the use of these names. The repetition of names created confusion in the media. Over time, all these units were officially renamed and given their new names.

The Western Media Is Whitewashing the Azov Battalion

The Nation
June 13, 2023
Author: Lev Golinkin

But there are also winners: the neofascists whom Putin’s war has turned into heroes.	One must lack any moral standards or ethical boundaries to claim that people who, while defending their country and their families, risked their own lives and health — many of whom died in battle, lost limbs, or were captured by Russians and subjected to torture — somehow gained a benefit from this and became “winners” in the sense implied by the author. Is the author of yet another propaganda article ready to experience even a tenth of what Azov fighters went through to “become a hero”?
For seven years, Western institutions have warned about Ukraine’s Azov Movement, which began as a neo-Nazi paramilitary group in 2014 and became notorious for its worldwide recruitment of extremists.	Azov has never conducted targeted recruitment of foreign fighters. The few foreigners who expressed a desire to serve in the unit underwent thorough checks to prevent the admission of fighters with extremist ideologies or questionable reputations. The “Azov movement,” which, according to the author, “Western institutions warned about,” did not exist in reality. This is a journalistic cliché spread by Russian propaganda in the West to discredit Azov.
Within months, Azov fighters were being feted in Congress and at Stanford University. MSNBC swooned over a Ukrainian soldier whose Twitter account overflowed with neo-Nazi images. Facebook made the stunning decision to allow posts praising the Azov Battalion, even though the company admitted that it was a hate group.	It is unclear which Ukrainian soldier with a “Twitter account filled with neo-Nazi images” is being referred to and what this has to do with Azov. Meta Platforms’ decision to lift the ban on mentioning Azov in its social networks was a serious blow to Russian propaganda. Azov has never posted any materials on its pages that could be interpreted as inciting hatred or hostility. The content published on the unit’s official pages demonstrates the combat operations of the unit and the training of Azov fighters. Similar content is published by dozens of other Ukrainian units that, like Azov, are defending their country from Russian occupation. The only possible response from Kremlin media and “experts” to this was the claim of “Western media whitewashing Azov,” which is highlighted in the title of this propaganda piece.
This overnight normalization of white supremacy was possible because Western institutions, driven by a zeal to ignore anything negative about our Ukrainian allies, decided that a neo-Nazi military formation in a war-torn nation had suddenly and miraculously stopped being neo-Nazi.	Azov has never been a “neo-Nazi” unit promoting “white supremacy.” The unit includes representatives of various ethnicities and religious beliefs, who do not experience any internal conflicts. They are united by the desire to protect Ukraine from Russian terror. Furthermore, Azov servicemen do not have conflicts with representatives of other ethnic groups outside the brigade. In the 10 years of the unit’s existence, Azov fighters have not committed a single hate crime. This is a rather strange statistic for a supposedly “neo-Nazi” unit that allegedly adheres to a racist ideology, as Golinkin tries to convince the reader.
Our whitewashing of Azov takes place amid a deadly surge of white supremacy that stretches from New Zealand to Buffalo, N.Y. That makes this a story about more than Ukraine. It’s about the deepest, nothing-matters cynicism that screams about 300 neo-Nazis in polo shirts yet embraces a brigade of battle-hardened extremists. It’s about warning that white supremacy—especially after being mainstreamed by Donald Trump and Fox News—is an existential threat to our society, while making it clear that some exclusions apply. It’s about “good people on both sides.”	The attempt to link the rise of right-wing political parties worldwide and political issues in the United States with Azov is an old trick of Russian propaganda. While funding right-wing political forces in the West, the Kremlin simultaneously tirelessly presents Azov as an influential part of a far-right conspiracy from various countries against the modern liberal order. How a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, which is subordinate to the country’s military command and whose sole task and desire is to protect the Ukrainian people from Russian aggression, poses an “existential threat” to American society is unclear. However, in the case of such alarmist statements, argumentation is not necessary. It is enough to repeat a few emotional and baseless claims to give the reader the impression of a real, imagined threat.
Azov was born shortly after the 2014 uprising that ousted Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych. Those events triggered a counter-revolt by Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine’s eastern regions who supported Yanukovych.	Golinkin openly manipulates by not mentioning the presence of Russian military and mercenaries in eastern Ukraine during the formation of the “DPR” and “LPR,” the provision of intelligence, weapons, and funding by the Russians to the separatists, thus trying to portray these events as an internal Ukrainian conflict, which repeats the Russian narrative of the “Russian-speaking people of Donbas rising against the Kyiv fascist regime.”
It quickly became apparent that the Ukrainian Army had been severely degraded by decades of corruption, leaving the new government struggling to combat the rebels. Into that void stepped far-right groups that formed volunteer battalions to fight for Kyiv. One of these groups, created out of the Patriot of Ukraine neo-Nazi gang, gained fame by helping restore Ukrainian government control over the city of Mariupol, a port on the Sea of Azov. It became known as the Azov Battalion.	In the spring of 2014, in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, several volunteer units were formed, which, given the low level of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that had been systematically destroyed by Yanukovych’s pro-Russian regime, turned out to be extremely motivated and effective. The Kremlin’s response to this was the construction of the myth of “neo-Nazi volunteer units” by the Russians. As the most successful and capable of all volunteer units, Azov eventually became the primary target of Russian propaganda.
Azov’s tactics and ideology were exactly what you’d expect from a paramilitary element formed by neo-Nazis. Its insignia features popular neo-Nazi symbols: the Wolfsangel (a runic double hook) and the Sonnenrad (sun wheel). Since then, the unit has become infamous for torture and for its aggressive recruitment of white supremacists from around the globe.	If Golinkin could provide at least one example of torture committed by Azov fighters or the “aggressive recruitment” allegedly conducted by the unit, he would certainly have done so. However, apart from baseless statements, there is no evidence to support such claims. Just another repetition of the mantra about the “Wolfsangel” on Azov’s chevron and ignoring the actual meaning of the monogram of the letters “I” and “N.” Golinkin might as well write a series of articles against the German cities of Siebensee, Eltville, Eppelborn, Dassendorf, and dozens of others, whose coats of arms truly depict the “Wolfsangel.” Kleinblittersdorf poses a particularly “existential threat” to the entire Western world. The coat of arms of this small German town features two “wolf hooks.” Its population (10,000 inhabitants) exceeds the number of Azov fighters.
In November 2014, Kyiv sought to gain control of the Azov Battalion by absorbing it into the government. Azov became a regiment in Ukraine’s National Guard, which made it a potential direct recipient of American aid.	On May 5, 2014, Azov was created as a special forces patrol police battalion under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Thus, from the very beginning, Azov was under the control of the Ukrainian authorities. In the fall of 2014, Azov was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine, becoming a separate special forces detachment.
The prospect of organized white fanatics being aided by the US quickly came to the attention of Congress, where lawmakers attempted to ban the Pentagon from working with Azov, though they were ultimately unsuccessful. Later, in 2018, a ban on providing US military aid to the Azov Regiment did pass.	The ban, resulting from the spread of myths about Azov by Russian propaganda, was finally lifted in June 2024. Azov underwent a review by the relevant U.S. authorities, who stated that they found no evidence of crimes by the unit’s servicemen that violated human rights.
Patriot of Ukraine—the gang whose members formed the original core of the Azov Battalion—always had geopolitical ambitions. Its leader, Andrii Biletskyi, who was Azov’s first commander, capitalized on its notoriety to develop political and street-muscle wings for the Azov brand. The regiment soon became just one part of a far larger entity: the Azov Movement.	Some of Azov’s initial fighters were indeed former members of the “Patriot of Ukraine.” However, none of them committed illegal actions or hate crimes. They were involved in patriotic education of youth, organizing sports events and competitions, and promoting Ukrainian history and culture. Moreover, “Patriot of Ukraine” was such a heterogeneous organization in terms of ideology that some of its former members ultimately decided to side with the “DPR” and “LPR.” The “Azov movement” mentioned by the author is a propaganda cliché, a phenomenon that never actually existed. Golinkin somehow does not mention that among the first Azov fighters were also members of civil society organizations such as “Automaidan,” journalists from leading Ukrainian media, ordinary students, and average Ukrainians. Were they also “neo-Nazis”?
In 2016, Biletskyi, who by then had left the regiment, established the far-right National Corps Party, headed by Azov veterans. Ukraine, despite Putin’s lies, is not teeming with fascists, which is why the National Corps has performed abysmally in elections. Where it did find success was in global networking with extremists.	Andrii Biletskyi resigned from military service in the fall of 2014 after which he became a member of the Ukrainian parliament. Since his resignation, he has had no influence on the unit. A military unit, according to Ukrainian law, cannot have its own political parties or movements, and servicemen are not allowed to engage in politics. The “National Corps” party had no relation to Azov, except for the fact that a few former servicemen of the unit were among its members.
Azov began sponsoring neo-Nazi concerts and sporting tournaments that attracted radicals: In 2018, the FBI arrested California white supremacists who had met with a member of the Azov Movement.	Azov never sponsored “neo-Nazi concerts.” The sports tournaments organized by Azov were held exclusively within the unit, and only Azov servicemen participated in them. Those detained by the FBI mentioned in the article are apparently members of the Rise Above Movement, who, according to the media, did not meet with Azov fighters but with representatives of the “National Corps” party, which was never part of Azov.
By 2021, the Azov Movement’s position as a premier hub of transnational white supremacy was firmly established. It was tracked by researchers; its fighters were banned from receiving military aid by Congress; and it was kicked off Facebook. The State Department declared its political wing a “nationalist hate group.” Journalists exposed its enlistment of fighters from Sweden to Australia.	The bans on Azov receiving weapons and being blocked on Meta platforms were the result of the spread of Russian propaganda by “researchers” like the author of this article. After the necessary checks and confirmation of the absence of evidence of Azov servicemen committing hate crimes and human rights violations, both bans were lifted in 2024 and 2023, respectively.
Then came Russia’s invasion. Within months, many of these same institutions had plunged into an Orwellian stampede to persuade the West that Ukraine’s neo-Nazi regiment was suddenly not a problem.	Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and the selfless struggle of the Ukrainian people, including the Azov fighters in besieged Mariupol, against the occupation, as well as the horrific crimes committed by Russian troops in Ukraine (the Bucha massacre, the destruction of the densely populated peaceful city of Mariupol, Russian torture chambers in Kherson, and shelling of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure) opened the eyes of the Western world to whose actions truly resemble the crimes of the Nazis and who is defending freedom and the free world from evil.
It wasn’t pretty. In 2018, The Guardian had published an article titled “Neo-Nazi Groups Recruit Britons to Fight in Ukraine,” in which the Azov Regiment was called “a notorious Ukrainian fascist militia.” Indeed, as late as November 2020, The Guardian was calling Azov a “neo-Nazi extremist movement.” But by February 2023, The Guardian was assuring readers that Azov’s fighters “are now leading the defence of Mariupol, insisting they have shed their previous dubious politics and rapidly becoming Ukrainian heroes.” The campaign believed to have recruited British far-right activists was now a thing of the past. The BBC had been among the first to warn of Azov, criticizing Kyiv in 2014 for ignoring a group that “sports three Nazi symbols on its insignia.” A 2018 report noted Azov’s “well-established links to the far right.” Shortly after Putin’s invasion, though, the BBC began to assert that although “to Russia, they are neo-Nazis and their origins lie in a neo-Nazi group,” the Azov Regiment was being “falsely portrayed as Nazi” by Moscow.	Some leading Western media outlets indeed spread Russian propaganda narratives about Azov, believing in baseless accusations that have been repeated year after year by various researchers of far-right movements. This is an example of the successful work of the Russian propaganda machine, which spends millions of dollars to shape a narrative that serves the Putin regime’s interests regarding events in Ukraine for a Western audience.
Meanwhile, Germany’s state-owned Deutsche Welle required only three months after the invasion to pivot from calling Azov “a neo-Nazi volunteer regiment” to saying it was “accused of having [a] neo-Nazi past” by Russia. By this logic, the BBC’s and Deutsche Welle’s previous Azov coverage had been lies concocted by the Kremlin.	It is incredible but true — Russian propaganda is very influential and extremely dangerous for the Western world. Indeed, the results of its activities can impact Western media and mislead journalists.
There is a kernel of truth in the allegations that Azov is just a Russian bogeyman. The Kremlin and Ukraine’s neo-Nazis have a symbiotic relationship that reaches to the very heart of this war: Putin needed a pretext to justify his illegal invasion; for that, he turned to Azov. Moscow seized on Azov’s existence to paint all of Ukraine as a cesspool of fascism in need of “denazification.” Azov is the linchpin in Putin’s narrative—without it, his excuse for the war is gone. In turn, Azov’s defenders have capitalized on Russia’s obsession by implying that anyone who criticizes the group is a Putin apologist. Moscow and Azov use each other to defend the indefensible: For Russia, it’s acceptable to invade a sovereign country to fight neo-Nazis; for the West, it’s appropriate to lionize neo-Nazis because they’re fighting Russia.	The author once again resorts to absolutely immoral manipulations, blaming the Azov fighters as the sole reason why Putin launched a bloody war against Ukraine. How, then, does Golinkin explain the annexation of Crimea and the creation of puppet separatist entities in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 when Azov did not even exist? Azov is “guilty” only because it became one of the most effective units opposing Russia’s imperialist plans to seize Ukraine, destroy Ukrainian identity, and deny the existence of Ukrainian culture, language, and history.
The problem with insisting that Azov’s neo-Nazism is just a Russian lie is the abundance of evidence to the contrary. Seven years’ worth of Western articles chronicling the group’s nature was too much to ignore. This left Azov’s whitewashers with the unenviable task of cobbling together a come-to-Jesus story in which Azov began as a neo-Nazi paramilitary group but somehow saw the error of its ways before 2022.	What “large amount of evidence” of neo-Nazism in Azov is Golinkin talking about? In a lengthy article, the author did not provide any evidence of actual crimes committed by Azov servicemen that would classify them as followers of hateful ideologies. The only argument is to hypnotize the reader with loud media headlines about “neo-Nazis in Azov,” which are also not supported by any evidence of illegal actions by the unit’s fighters based on hatred.
The narrative that emerged goes like this: (a) Azov’s deradicalization started after it joined Ukraine’s National Guard—over time, Biletskyi and other veterans of the 2014 battalion were filtered out, implying that the new leadership is neo-Nazi free; (b) yes, there are a few leftover neo-Nazis in the National Corps, Azov’s political party; but (c) that doesn’t matter, because the Azov Regiment—later a brigade—has long since separated from the National Corps, which is little more than a fringe political sideshow.	The National Corps was never “Azov’s political party,” so there was no need to “separate” from it.
These talking points were propagated by Kyiv, Azov, and a handful of experts furnishing quotes from one journalist to the next; the press, in turn, dashed out articles reporting these claims as fact. In reading these pieces, one quickly notes the absence of evidence. The “Azov has been denazified” story is presented as verified truth, often using quotes from the same few experts who also state it without offering proof. There’s a reason for that: The whole thing is composed of easily disprovable falsehoods.	Demanding proof of “denazification” of Azov without providing any evidence confirming that Azov fighters committed hate crimes that would indicate the existence of Nazi ideology within the unit is a typical propaganda tactic. However, if you carefully watch Golinkin’s sleight of hand and do not fall under the hypnosis of his clichéd accusations, it easily dulls down.
Take the notion that Azov was deradicalized after joining the National Guard in November 2014. This ignores the fact that Western outlets routinely documented Azov’s neo-Nazism over the next seven years, through 2021.	The constant repetition of accusations of “neo-Nazism” without any evidence of Azov fighters committing crimes that could be associated with hateful ideologies is, in Golinkin’s opinion, “routinely documented Azov’s neo-Nazism.” It is unclear where the “documentation” is. Where is even one document?
Whatever reformative influence Kyiv had to offer clearly didn’t work: Azov continued to recruit white supremacists, and in 2016, it was accused by human rights groups of committing war crimes—the only difference being that after 2014, it did so as part of a NATO-trained force.	It would be interesting to see the names and surnames of the “white supremacists recruited by Azov.” There is a loud statement but, once again, no evidence. The “accusations” against Azov by human rights organizations in 2016 are discussed further below (Spoiler: they are also unfounded).
The problem is that both Prokopenko and Palamar were Azov members going back to 2014. Supposedly led by new blood, the unit was actually commanded by veterans of its far-right beginning.	Azov commander Denys “Redis” Prokopenko and deputy commander Sviatoslav “Kalyna” Palamar, who in 2014, motivated by patriotic feelings and a desire to defend Ukraine from the occupiers, joined the newly formed unit as volunteers, were ordinary soldiers in Azov at the time and did not make any decisions regarding the unit.
Palamar’s neo-Nazi roots reach back even further—he belonged to the Patriot of Ukraine gang that formed Azov. Yet the AP and Haaretz both cited Palamar downplaying Azov’s extremism while reporting nothing about his past with Patriot of Ukraine.	At a young age, Sviatoslav “Kalyna” Palamar was indeed a member of “Patriot of Ukraine.” Driven by patriotic convictions and understanding the threat Russia posed to Ukrainian statehood and identity, Palamar joined the youth movement, where he organized sports events for Ukrainian youth and promoted Ukrainian culture and history. He did not participate in any illegal activities and had no issues with law enforcement agencies.
Prokopenko, for his part, came out of the White Boys Club, superfans of the Dynamo Kyiv soccer team (far-right groups organized around soccer teams are common across Europe), who celebrated him when he was given an award in October 2022. The group’s Facebook posts have typically included phrases like “100% White” and “88” (code for “Heil Hitler”), praise for Holocaust perpetrators, and Waffen-SS insignia. During his time in Azov, Prokopenko’s platoon was unofficially called the Borodach Division. Its insignia was the Totenkopf, the skull-and-crossbones design used by the SS, which has become a popular neo-Nazi symbol. (Azov’s version added some fascist whimsy by giving the skull a beard and hipster mustache.)	Denys “Redis” Prokopenko was indeed a fan of the Dynamo Kyiv football club. Calling tens of thousands of Ukrainians “Nazis” simply because they support a Kyiv football club is madness. The White Boys Club is an informal association of completely different people who are the most active fans of the club, traveling with the team to away games in other cities and countries. Anyone can join the ultras’ sections. Supporting a football club cannot be equated to supporting any ideology, even if some other fans may adhere to it.The use of a modified hipster “death’s head” with a beard and mustache by an informal group of Azov fighters was an obvious mockery of the widespread propaganda cliché about “Nazis” in Azov. This emblem was not the official emblem of the company. None of the fighters in this company committed hate crimes. The entire “neo-Nazism” lies in a foolish joke mocking Russian propaganda.
But that’s just the first Azov Brigade. Over the past year, the movement has spawned new formations led by extremists.	In Ukraine, there is only one unit with the word “Azov” in its name — the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine. Other units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, created with the participation of Azov veterans who left service in Azov, are separate units and are not associated with Azov.
Prominent ones included Azov offshoots in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Sumy, which were eventually merged. Today, the Azov Movement counts two brigades: the initial one in the National Guard and the recently created one in the army.	At the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, Azov veterans who had already completed their service in the unit joined the territorial defense and named their newly created units “Azov.” This was a personal initiative of these veterans; Azov’s command did not initiate the use of these names. Over time, all these units were officially renamed and received their own new names. The unit created in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which the author attributes to the non-existent “Azov movement,” is the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, which includes some former Azov servicemen.
These are only some examples of Azov military units commanded by veterans of the original neo-Nazi battalion and/or leaders of the National Corps. So much for denazification.	There is no “Azov military units.” There is only one Azov — the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine. The National Corps party is not associated with Azov.
A few years ago, the ex–Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke embarked on a rebranding campaign by telling journalists that he was not a white supremacist but a “human rights activist.” His claim was covered by Esquire, ABC, Politico, and The New York Times.	A clumsy manipulation that is strangely taken seriously and commented on from a standpoint of common sense.
In their rush to lionize Azov, however, Western institutions have been far more reckless. The Times of London celebrated Azov’s supposed conversion by referring to it as “an elite battalion challenging its far-right reputation.” The purported evidence for this included a Ukrainian soldier’s claim that “We are patriots but we are not Nazis,” and a statement by “an expert on the European right” that “Azov has evolved so far from its origins as to make its far-right roots meaningless.”	Yes, Azov fighters are patriots, not “Nazis.” For the first time, Golinkin’s article tells the truth, albeit only in a quote from The Times.
The photos The Times ran with the article show an Azov soldier wearing a T-shirt for M8L8TH, a vicious neo-Nazi band with songs praising Hitler and featuring unabashed anti-Semitism. M8L8TH is linked to Azov; the California neo-Nazis arrested by the FBI had met with its lead singer in Kyiv. It’s hard to find a more fitting illustration of the media blithely whitewashing neo-Nazis.	The band M8l8th is not associated with Azov. The person in civilian clothing depicted in the photo wearing this band’s T-shirt is not an Azov serviceman.
Forbes similarly cheered Azov’s alleged denazification by running the demonstrably false claim that it had stopped using the Wolfsangel symbol. The Wolfsangel is one of the first things you see on Azov’s website, just as it was on the day the Forbes story ran; in fact, it’s the profile photo for all Azov’s social media accounts.	Azov’s chevron does not depict the “Wolfsangel.” This was mentioned above.
The whitewashing of neo-Nazi history extends even to Biletskyi, who had been so toxic that even Azov’s defenders refused to normalize him. That didn’t stop the Financial Times from running Biletskyi’s quotes about Azov being “patriotic” and “nationalist.” The FT then quoted him praising Stepan Bandera, a Nazi collaborator whose men massacred Jews, as a hero.	Andrii Biletskyi left Azov in 2014 and engaged in political activities not associated with Azov.
A far more dangerous platforming came from Facebook, which had banned Azov in 2019. In February 2022, Facebook loosened the ban in surreal, Dril-esque fashion: The company acknowledged that Azov remained a hate group but decided to allow posts praising it, as long as the praise was about defending Ukraine. It was a “both-sides-ing” of white supremacy, a chilling message that, sometimes, neo-Nazis are heroes. Meta, Facebook’s parent company, later simplified matters by removing the Azov Regiment from its list of dangerous organizations.	Once again, a blow to Russian propaganda — the lifting of the ban on the official unit of the National Guard of Ukraine is perceived by Golinkin as extremely painful.
Others, too, said the quiet part out loud. “Finally, it is worth noting that the ‘neo-Nazi Azov regiment’ has never been implicated in any actual extremist acts—with the sole exception of credible reports of human rights violations, including torture of detainees, by Azov fighters in the Donbas in 2015–2016,” wrote The Bulwark. They may have tortured people, but nobody’s perfect.	The author of the article in The Bulwark, which Golinkin quotes, references materials from Amnesty International dated July 21, 2016, which are not directly related to Azov. The text about Azov contains only the following: “Credible allegations emerged of torture and other egregious abuses by Ukraine’s so-called volunteer battalions Aidar and Azov. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have received numerous allegations of unlawful detention and the use of torture and other abuses by Azov battalion and will be reporting on them in the near future.” However, Amnesty International did not publish any materials on this issue afterward. Without providing any evidence, this looks like an unsubstantiated accusation and an attempt to discredit the National Guard of Ukraine. If these acts of torture occurred, why is there no evidence or testimony provided?
By September 2022, as the campaign to transform Azov into paladins of democracy purred along, America rolled out the red carpet.	Starting with the use of Russian propaganda narratives, fakes, manipulations, and baseless accusations, Golinkin arrives at a conspiracy theory.
Then came Stanford University, which welcomed Azov even though seven months earlier its own program for tracking extremism had published an exhaustive study detailing Azov’s Nazi ties. The event was attended by Michael McFaul, a former US ambassador to Russia and an adherent of the “Azov has been denazified” myth, who stood in front of a projection of its Wolfsangel insignia.	In June 2024, Azov was removed from the list of extremist groups by The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, which is formed based on the internet project Mapping Militants Project. The “Azov battalion” article contained numerous factual errors, inaccuracies, and outright lies inspired by Russian propaganda regarding Azov. As mentioned earlier, Azov’s chevron has nothing to do with the “Wolfsangel.”
It sometimes seems that we’re witnessing an experiment in America’s willingness to ignore what’s in front of our own eyes. In February, an employee of the federal government’s US Helsinki Commission giddily tweeted out photos of himself posing with the Azov Wolfsangel and wearing a patch with a picture of a Ukrainian Nazi collaborator; the employee continued defending the tweets, even as he eventually deleted them. It’s hard to imagine this being tolerated with other Holocaust perpetrators (see the media storms surrounding similar collaborators).	Paul Massaro, whom Golinkin mentions, indeed took a photo with the Azov flag, which, as previously stated, has no connection to the “Wolfsangel.” Massaro’s photo with a patch depicting Stepan Bandera is not related to Azov. Bandera himself was a prisoner of a Nazi concentration camp and refused to collaborate with the Nazis. Defining him as a “collaborator” directly follows the Soviet propaganda narrative aimed at discrediting forces fighting for an independent Ukraine, which began to take shape during World War II.
Or take Azov’s press officer, Dmytro Kozatsky, who was paraded around Congress, MSNBC, Vogue, and a Manhattan film festival. As Robeson reported, Kozatsky’s Twitter account was a Whitman’s Sampler of white supremacy, including the “1488” neo-Nazi code, Waffen-SS insignia, a swastika, and myriad “likes” for images such as a Totenkopf, Adolf Hitler, Nazi murderer Amon Goeth, the KKK, and graffiti reading “Death to Kikes.”	Currently, Dmytro Kozatsky is not a serviceman in Azov. In Azov, the command prohibits using any Nazi symbols. Violation of this ban is punishable, up to dismissal from the unit. If such precedents have occurred, the responsibility lies with the individual serviceman, and it cannot be interpreted as the position or ideology of the unit. In any military unit in the world, including in the U.S., there are isolated cases like this, but no one concludes that the entire unit is “neo-Nazi” because of it.
As Azov’s defenders in Washington love to point out, the brigade and its offshoots are merely a tiny fraction of Ukraine’s armed forces. Why focus on them? they intone. That’s what Putin does!	Azov has no offshoots.
The saddest thing about this logic—aside from stating that a battle-hardened neo-Nazi formation in an unstable, war-torn country isn’t a big deal—is that it’s true.	What actually concerns Golinkin, like Russian propaganda, is not the fabricated “neo-Nazism” in Azov, but the existence in Ukraine of a motivated, experienced, and professional military unit whose fighters see their main task as defending Ukraine and its people.
Azov is a small fraction of those fighting to save Ukraine. For every feat attributed to Azov units, there were many more accomplished by others. Even the legendary siege of Mariupol last year that made Azov famous involved Ukrainian marines who suffered and held out just as bravely. We could have honored them. Instead, we went out of our way to glorify Azov.	During the battle for Mariupol in 2022, Azov was the backbone of the city’s defense. Participants in the defense of Mariupol repeatedly mentioned in interviews that fighters from other units constantly asked to have at least one Azov fighter sent to their positions, whose level of training and motivation immediately boosted the morale and effectiveness of the soldiers around them. The defense of the city was led by Azov commander Denys “Redis” Prokopenko. Undoubtedly, other Ukrainian units were also an important part of Mariupol’s defense. However, it is impossible to imagine such a prolonged defense of the city without the soldiers and officers of Azov. Their heroization is a completely understandable and fair reaction to their feat.
Nobody forced us to. It’s been a choice, and considering that Googling Azov’s name yields hit after hit about white supremacy, it’s a conscious, informed one. Putin isn’t the only one obsessed with Azov. We can’t get enough of them. They’re our neo-Nazis.	The appearance of mentions linking Azov with “white supremacy” in Google search results is related to the constant proliferation of articles like this one on the internet. They all share one thing: the baselessness of their accusations. Concluding his “investigation,” in which the author failed to provide any evidence of real hate crimes committed by Azov servicemen that could indicate a “neo-Nazi” nature of the unit, Golinkin uses a “killer” argument—Azov are Nazis because that’s what it says on the internet.

Volunteer Ukrainian unit includes Nazis

USA Today
October 3, 2015
Author: OREN DORELL

A volunteer brigade with self-proclaimed Nazis fighting alongside government troops against Russian-backed separatists is proving to be a mixed blessing to its cause.	The separation of Azov from government forces is erroneous, as Azov has been part of Ukraine’s armed forces since its inception—an official unit under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and later the National Guard of Ukraine. Representatives of Azov and the unit as a whole have never considered themselves adherents of Nazi ideology.
Though the 900-member Azov Brigade adds needed manpower to repulse the rebels, members who say they are Nazis are sparking controversy, and complaints of abuses against civilians have turned some residents against them.	The statement about “members who say they are Nazis” is manipulative. The person who calls themselves a “Nazi” in the text is expressing their own views, not the ideology of the entire unit. Meanwhile, some Azov members consider themselves nationalists, but the nation is interpreted by them not in a biological sense, which is evidenced by the presence of representatives of various ethnic groups within the unit. Azov’s nationalism is structured around the values of a political nation.”Complaints about mistreatment of civilians” is another cliché of Russian propaganda regarding Azov. There has not been a single case of human rights violations by Azov fighters, as confirmed by the conclusions of the relevant U.S. government bodies. After Azov liberated Mariupol from pro-Russian terrorists in 2014 and until the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, the city held annual celebrations in honor of its liberation, in which both civilians and Azov members participated together.
A drill sergeant who would identify himself only as Alex wore a patch depicting Thor’s Hammer, an ancient Norse symbol appropriated by neo-Nazis, according to the Anti-Defamation League.	In the Marvel universe, which is a significant part of modern Western popular culture, the history and image of Thor, the god of Germanic-Scandinavian mythology armed with the hammer Mjolnir, are used. No one accuses the creators of Marvel comics and films of neo-Nazism for using a character from an ancient Scandinavian myth and his attributes. Motifs from Scandinavian mythology are used by hundreds of thousands of people worldwide. The warrior traditions of the Vikings have influenced subsequent European warrior culture, in which military personnel from various countries around the world still find motifs that resonate with their worldview, such as the values of valor, courage, bravery, fearlessness, and readiness to die in battle.
In an interview with USA TODAY, he admitted he is a Nazi and said with a laugh that no more than half his comrades are fellow Nazis. He said he supports strong leadership for Ukraine, like Germany during World War II, but opposes the Nazis’ genocide against Jews. Minorities should be tolerated as long as they are peaceful and don’t demand special privileges, he said, and the property of wealthy oligarchs should be taken away and nationalized. He vowed that when the war ends, his comrades will march on the capital, Kiev, to oust a government they consider corrupt.	By identifying themselves as a “Nazi,” this person is speaking only about themselves and cannot represent the entire unit. The motivation behind such statements may vary, from a desire to shock a Western journalist and mock the constant questions about “Nazism in Azov” to articulating personal beliefs. However, regardless of this motivation, Azov fighters have never engaged in actions aimed at inciting national, racial, or religious hatred and hostility, or at degrading national honor and dignity. Moreover, since 2015, when this article was written, Azov has completely cleansed itself of any subcultural and marginal elements that might have identified themselves as supporters of extremist ideologies.
Andriy Diachenko, a spokesman for the Azov Brigade, said only 10% to 20% of the group’s members are Nazis. “I know Alex is a Nazi, but it’s his personal ideology. It has nothing to do with the official ideology of the Azov,” Diachenko said. “He’s a good drill sergeant and a good instructor for tactics and weapons skills.”	The private opinion of a unit member with an obviously ironic subtext mocks the established myths about Azov being “neo-Nazis.” No statistics have ever existed or could exist.
The brigade’s deputy commander, Oleg Odnorozhenko, complained that Alex does not speak for the group. “If he has his own sympathies, it’s his own matter,” Odnorozhenko said in a former high school serving as a base. “But he has no right to make statements in a way they can be construed as the position of the regiment. He will be dealt with severely for his lack of discipline.”	Exactly. The individual words of a serviceman cannot be interpreted as the position of the unit.
In one case of alleged abuse, shop owner Svetlana Gudina, 51, said Azov troops detained her two sons, ages 28 and 32, and seized their cars, cash, flash drives and documents while searching for separatists last September. The men were released, and she managed to recover the cars and money, but the experience destroyed her trust in Ukrainian authorities. “If they have come to defend us, let them defend,” Gudina said. “But when they come to molest and humiliate civilians, it’s wrong.”	It is impossible to verify if such a situation actually occurred. However, the men may have been checked on suspicion of collaborating with pro-Russian separatists: according to Ukrainian law, fighters of the National Guard of Ukraine, which is part of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, have the right to detain individuals suspected of committing illegal actions. Moreover, the accusations from this woman are unclear, especially since, according to her, the men were released, and their cars and money were returned.

How Many Neo-Nazis Is the U.S. Backing in Ukraine?

The Daily Beast
June 9, 2015
Authors: Will Cathcart, Joseph Epstein

Not all the members of the Ukrainian ultranationalist militias the U.S. is training have SS tattoos, and not all espouse fascism. But enough do to be worrisome.	Azov is not and has never been an “ultranationalist militia.” It is a structured unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, which is subordinate to the orders of Ukraine’s military command. The claim that there is a significant number of those who support fascism and have SS tattoos is subjective and manipulative, as it cannot be verified.
Sergeant Ivan Kharkiv of the Azov Battalion is 21 years old but seems years beyond his age	At the time of the interview, Azov was already a regiment of the National Guard of Ukraine.
The young officer invites us to walk with him through the yard of the dilapidated former School #61—now an Azov Battalion base on the east side of the city of Mariupol.	At the time of the interview, Azov was already a regiment of the National Guard of Ukraine.
The Azov is a volunteer militia of the Ukrainian Nation Guard that has proven fiercely effective in battle. It answers directly to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and works closely with the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU, handing over prisoners and providing intelligence.	There are no militias within the National Guard of Ukraine. Azov became part of the National Guard as a special Forces patrol regiment, remaining under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.The wording about broad cooperation with various defense units may be misunderstood in light of the previous point. As a unit within the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov appropriately communicates and interacts with other structural units of the defense forces to enhance effectiveness in combat operations.
The young sergeant then takes the conversation in a different direction, as if preparing to face the elephant in the schoolyard. He starts to talk about Nazis, and not the old ones, the new ones, some of whom are in the Azov’s ranks.	Journalistic manipulation.
When the soldier is gone Kharkiv sighs and says, “And yes we also have some guys who support those ideas. But guys with rightist extreme ideologies are in all armies… in the U.S. and in Russia. There are skinheads, for example. We tell them ‘OK, but we have a National Ukraine ideology. If you don’t have this as well, then you can leave.’ But also we have guys from many religions, who believe in different gods or no god, and they all sleep in the same room.”	A journalistic tactic intended to force a representative of the unit to defend against Russian disinformation.
Kharkiv tells us that there is a Jew in the battalion, but we have not met him.	From the very beginning, Azov has included members of different ethnic groups, including Jews. One of the most famous Azov fighters of Jewish descent is Ruslan Serbov, who, in 2022, flew in a helicopter to assist his comrades in besieged Mariupol, suffered a severe injury, and lost a leg. His call sign, “David,” refers to King David of Israel.
For the Azov, it’s not just a matter of the occasional very confused kid hung up on some twisted variant of the Nazi ideology who wants to enlist. One could say it goes back to the history of collaboration between some Ukraine nationalists and the Nazis fighting the Soviets during World War II. But more specifically and more recently there is a recurring history of Nazi ideology in the battalion that goes back to its founder, Andrii Biletskyi, who pulled together the neo-Nazi group called the Social-National Assembly (SNA) in 2008.	The Russian perspective on the history of Ukrainian nationalism and the Ukrainian liberation struggle through the lens of “collaboration” with Nazi Germany during World War II is a common theme. The demonization of Ukrainian nationalism and its portrayal as “radical nationalism” is a typical Russian imperial vision that denies Ukrainian sovereignty and the right to self-determination.
Last year, Biletskyi and the SNA created the Azov Battalion as a volunteer militia. Both the battalion and the SNA sport what is essentially a crude swastika on their logo, although they publically deny that it is a swastika. Some members of the Azov Battalion even wear the swastika symbol against a yellow background as armbands. A significant portion of the Azov Battalion denies, at least publicly, that it has any neo-Nazi or white supremacist beliefs. Instead these members claim that the swastika-ish symbol on their flags and logo is not a swastika but an N and an I combined to mean “national identity.” This is a hard sell considering the ideology of Biletskyi, their founder and military commander. Also, the numerous swastika tattoos of different members and their tendency to go into battle with swastikas or SS insignias on their helmets make it very difficult for other members of the group to plausibly deny any neo-Nazi affiliations.	Azov is a structured unit of the National Guard of Ukraine under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Azov was founded as a special Forces patrol battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on May 5, 2014, in Mariupol. Azov has never been a militia, as it has always been a structured military unit. The official emblem of the unit is the “Idea of the Nation.” The interpretation of this symbol as a “Wolfsangel” is Russian manipulation.
This creates a problem for those members of the battalion like Kharkiv who are clearly not neo-Nazis. But it creates a far larger problem for the Ukrainian government, which relies immensely on the group, as one of its most effective fighting forces, to defend the city of Mariupol and 100 kilometers of the front line.	As a unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov has never caused any problems for the Ukrainian government. There is no proven instance of Azov fighters disobeying the orders of Ukraine’s military command. Ten servicemen of Azov have been awarded the highest honor in Ukraine, the title of Hero of Ukraine. The Order of the “Gold Star,” awarded to those who receive this title, is personally presented by the President of Ukraine. Hundreds of Azov fighters have been awarded other state honors.
Azov is completely entrenched in the power structure of the country. “We work with all defense systems of the Ukrainian government,” Kharkiv says.	The wording about broad cooperation with various defense units may be misunderstood in light of the previous point. As a unit within the National Guard of Ukraine, Azov appropriately communicates and interacts with other structural units of the defense forces to enhance effectiveness in combat operations.
The Ukrainian government isn’t the only government that should be concerned. The United States government at this moment is training parts of the Azov Battalion along with other Ukrainian National Guard battalions near the city of Lviv in western Ukraine. This unfortunate reality gives what Kharkiv calls “Putin TV” and the rest of the Kremlin propaganda machine everything it needs to portray the Ukraine government as fascist and the Americans as backing crypto-Nazis.	Azov is a structured unit of the National Guard of Ukraine under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Azov was founded as a special Forces patrol battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on May 5, 2014, in Mariupol. Azov has never been a militia, as it has always been a structured military unit.The marginalization of a highly effective unit was a successful step by the Russians from 2014 to 2022 to reduce the combat readiness of the defense forces in their target region, which allowed them to establish a “land corridor to Crimea” by 2022.
In some ways the incessant, noxious and once seemingly absurd Russian propaganda has become a self-fulfilling prophecy: The U.S. government is knowingly training and arming neo-Nazi Ukrainian ultranationalist paramilitary members in broad daylight in an unstable country with an unclear future. Nineteen million dollars of U.S. taxpayers’ money is going into this. We are all paying for it. There is no denying this one.	One of the Russian narratives is the portrayal of Ukraine as a failed state. Strategically, this allowed the marginalization of the Ukrainian defense forces and the isolation of Ukraine from Western aid, including military assistance.
Is the territorial integrity of Ukraine worth fighting for? Absolutely. But by not only relying on these dodgy groups for stability but also by empowering, training and further arming them, leaders from both Ukraine and the United States are making very poor choices. They are gambling with the future of the Ukrainian people—one that is not theirs to lose.	Journalistic manipulation intended to marginalize a combat unit and represent it as a “group.”
It will take years for political scientists to understand the various shades and brands of extremism that slowly gravitate to the front lines of both sides of this kind of war.	“Extremists” who could pose a threat to national security cannot serve in the Ukrainian defense forces. Azov fighters are servicemen of a structured unit of the National Guard of Ukraine, not “extremists” influenced by Russian propaganda narratives from Kremlin playbooks.
So, what is most alarming is where these U.S.-trained warriors will go and what they will do when there is no war left to fight and when all is quiet on this eastern front.	There are no documented cases of Azov fighters applying their combat skills outside of battle. As highly motivated servicemen, at the most critical moment for the state’s existence, they stood up to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, demonstrating their sacrifice and readiness to fight to the last for Ukraine and its people, even under the most extreme conditions.